Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Burkhard C. Schipper
Author-Name-First: Burkhard C.
Author-Name-Last: Schipper
Author-Name: Jörg Oechssler
Author-Name-First: Jörg
Author-Name-Last: Oechssler
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, University of California Davis
Title: Incentives for Subjects in Internet Experiments
Abstract: Internet experiments are a new and convenient way for reaching a large subject pool. Yet, providing incentives to subjects can be a tricky design issue. One cost effective and simple method is the publication of a high score (as in computer games). We test whether a high score provides adequate and non-distortionary incentives by comparing it to the usual performance based incentives. We find significant differences and conclude that high scores are not always appropriate as an incentive device. Performance based financial incentives seem to be required also in internet experiments.
Length: 15
File-URL: https://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/3uLPTPp48RburEQU9XLfJ5zx/08-1.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Number: 99
Classification-JEL: C72, C91, C92, D43, L13, C72, C91, C92, D43, L13
KeyWords: incentives, internet, experiments, high score,incentives, internet, experiments, high score
Creation-Date: 20080220
Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:99