Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Burkhard Schipper
Author-Name-First: Burkhard
Author-Name-Last: Schipper
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, University of California Davis
Title: AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part II: from PBE to sequential equilibrium.
Abstract: This is a slightly extended version of a chapter prepared for the Handbook of Logics for Knowledge and Belief edited by Hans van Ditmarsch, Joseph Y. Halpern, Wiebe van der Hoek, and Barteld Kooi, College Publications, London. 
 
 In [5] (Int. J. Game Theory, 42:567-592, 2013) a general notion of perfect Bayesian equilib-
 rium (PBE) was introduced for extensive-form games and shown to be intermediate between
 subgame-perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. The essential ingredient of the pro-
 posed notion is the existence of a plausibility order on the set of histories that rationalizes a
 given assessment. In this paper we study restrictions on the belief revision policy encoded in a
 plausibility order and provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a PBE to be a sequential
 equilibrium.
Length: 63
File-URL: https://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/Wb3QkeW6tdss4cwCY38Wg9T1/14-1.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Number: 83
Classification-JEL: 
KeyWords: plausibility order, belief revision, Bayesian updating, independence, sequential equi- librium, consistency
Creation-Date: 20140106
Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:83