Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Burkhard C. Schipper
Author-Name-First: Burkhard C.
Author-Name-Last: Schipper
Author-Name: Philippe Raab
Author-Name-First: Philippe
Author-Name-Last: Raab
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, University of California Davis
Title: Cournot Competition between Teams: An Experimental Study
Abstract: In the economic literature on market competition, firms are often modelled as single decision makers and the internal organization of the firm is neglected (unitary player assumption). However, as the literature on strategic delegation suggests, one can not generally expect that the behavior of teams is equivalent to the behavior of individuals in Cournot competition. Nevertheless, there are models of team-organization such that team-firms and individual firms are behaviorally equivalent. This provides a theoretical foundation for the unitary player assumption in Cournot competition. We show that this assumption is robust in experiments, which is in contrast to experimental results on price competition.
Length: 29
File-URL: https://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/rnES7zJjpWQo1Tbjssv83Byp/06-26.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Number: 77
Classification-JEL: C72, C91, C92, D21, D23, D43, L13, L22, M52
KeyWords: Unitary player assumption, Group behavior, Experiments, Theory of the firm.
Creation-Date: 20060921
Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:77