Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Giacomo Bonanno
Author-Name-First: Giacomo
Author-Name-Last: Bonanno
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, University of California Davis
Title: Epistemic foundations of game theory
Abstract: This is the first draft of a chapter for the forthcoming Handbook of Epistemic Logic, edited by Hans van Ditmarsch, Joe Halpern, Wiebe van der Hoek and Barteld Kooi (College Publications). 
 Contents:
 1. Introduction
 2. Epistemic Models of Strategic-Form Games
 3. Semantic Analysis of Common Belief of Rationality
 4. Syntactic Characterization of Common Belief of Rationality
 5. Common Belief versus Common Knowledge
 6. Probabilistic Beliefs and von Neumann- Morgenstern Payoffs
 7. Dynamic Games with Perfect Information
 8. The Semantics of Belief Revision
 9. Common Belief of Rationality in Perfect-Information Games
 10. Literature Review
Length: 37
File-URL: https://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/5SPPQjrfMmsZiyqrURSCMxS4/12-11.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Number: 70
Classification-JEL: C7
KeyWords: Common belief, common knowledge, rationality, strategic-form game, dynamic game, belief revision
Creation-Date: 20120520
Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:70