Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Burkhard C. Schipper
Author-Name-First: Burkhard C.
Author-Name-Last: Schipper
Author-Name: Martin Meier
Author-Name-First: Martin
Author-Name-Last: Meier
Author-Name: Aviad Heifetz
Author-Name-First: Aviad
Author-Name-Last: Heifetz
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, University of California Davis
Title: Dynamic Unawareness and Rationalizable Behavior
Abstract: We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for mutual unawareness of actions. We extend Pearce's (1984) notion of extensive-form (correlated) rationalizability to this setting, explore its properties and prove existence. We define also a new variant of this solution concept, prudent rationalizability, which refines the set of outcomes induced by extensive-form rationalizable strategies. Finally, we define the normal form of a generalized extensive-form game, and characterize in it extensive-form rationalizability by iterative conditional dominance.
Length: 57
File-URL: https://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/46A1WHknkexr4Vh9rNFHcdau/09-10.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Number: 39
Classification-JEL: C70, C72, D80, D82
KeyWords: Unawareness, extensive-form games, extensive-form rationalizability, prudent rationalizability, iterative conditional dominance
Creation-Date: 20091028
Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:39