Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Burkhard C. Schipper
Author-Name-First: Burkhard C.
Author-Name-Last: Schipper
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, University of California Davis
Title: Conditional Dominance in Games with Unawareness
Abstract: Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013) introduced dynamic games with unawareness consisting of a partially ordered set of games in extensive form. Here, we study the normal form of dynamic games with unawareness. The generalized normal form associated with a dynamic game with unawareness consists of a partially ordered set of games in normal form. We characterize strong rationalizability (resp., prudent rationalizability) in dynamic games with unawareness by iterated conditional strict (resp., weak) dominance in the associated generalized normal form. We also show that the analogue to iterated admissibility for dynamic games with unawareness depends on the extensive form. This is because, under unawareness, a player's information set not only determines which nodes she considers possible but also which game tree(s) she is aware of.
Length: 30
File-URL: https://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/uyvgkrfx3ibfd6g0bqnb0i2jwfqt/condom20260428.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Number: 380
Classification-JEL: C72, D83
KeyWords: Awareness, unknown unknowns, extensive form, normal form, strong rationalizabity, extensive-form rationalizability, prudent rationalizability, iterated conditional dominance, iterated admissibility
Creation-Date: 20260429
Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:380