Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Ki Vin Foo
Author-Name-First: Ki Vin
Author-Name-Last: Foo
Author-Name: Burkhard C. Schipper
Author-Name-First: Burkhard C.
Author-Name-Last: Schipper
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, University of California Davis
Title: Kuhn's Theorem for Games of the Extensive Form with Unawareness
Abstract: We extend Kuhn's Theorem to games of the extensive form with unawareness. This extension is not obvious: First, games of the extensive form with non-trivial unawareness involve a forest of partially ordered game trees rather than just one game tree. An information set at a node in one tree may consist of nodes in a less expressive tree. Consequently, perfect recall takes a more complicated form as players may also become aware of new actions during the play. Second, strategies can only be partially an object of ex ante choice in games with unawareness. Finally, nodes that a player may expect to reach with a strategy profile may not be the nodes that actually occur with this strategy profile, requiring us to define appropriate notions of equivalence of strategies. We show if a game of the extensive form with unawareness has perfect recall, then for each mixed strategy there is an equivalent behavior strategy but the converse does not hold under unawareness.
Length: 29
File-URL: https://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/e9htj0b0w86b327cj08hvsqdcu81/unawkuhn9.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Number: 369
Classification-JEL: C72, D83
KeyWords: Perfect recall, mixed strategy, behavior strategy, unawareness
Creation-Date: 20250304
Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:369