Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Ki Vin Foo
Author-Name-First: Ki Vin
Author-Name-Last: Foo
Author-Name: Burkhard C. Schipper
Author-Name-First: Burkhard C.
Author-Name-Last: Schipper
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, University of California Davis
Title: Kuhn's Theorem for Games of the Extensive Form with Unawareness
Abstract: We extend Kuhn's Theorem to games of the extensive form with unawareness. We prove that if a game of the extensive form with unawareness has perfect recall, then for each mixed strategy there is an equivalent behavior strategy. We show that the converse does not hold under unawareness without restricting the evolution of the player's awareness to constant awareness along paths of play. Both directions of Kuhn's Theorem for games of the extensive form with unawareness require a condition complementary to perfect recall that rules out falsely believing in some events when the player is unaware of the actual past events.
Length: 35
File-URL: https://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/poieoogc9pihsf9nequrpiki12lp/unawkuhn16.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Number: 369
Classification-JEL: C72, D83
KeyWords: Perfect recall, mixed strategy, behavior strategy, unawareness
Creation-Date: 20250304
Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:369