Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Martin Meier
Author-Name-First: Martin
Author-Name-Last: Meier
Author-Name: Burkhard C. Schipper
Author-Name-First: Burkhard C.
Author-Name-Last: Schipper
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, University of California Davis
Title: Conditional dominance in games with unawareness
Abstract: Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2013) introduced generalized extensive-form games that allow for asymmetric unawareness. Here, we study the normal form of a generalized extensive-form game. The generalized normal-form game associated to a generalized extensive-form game with unawareness may consist of a collection of normal-form games. We use it to characterize extensive-form rationalizability (resp. prudent rationalizability) in generalized extensive-form games by iterative conditional strict (resp. weak) dominance in the associated generalized normal-form. We also show that the analogue to iterated admissibility for generalized normal-form games is not independent of the extensive-form structure. This is because under unawareness, a player's information set not only determines which nodes he considers possible but also of which game tree(s) he is aware of.
Length: 30
File-URL: https://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/1xNTcwdu2yysGCxYcPnT8Ktp/condom20230426.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Number: 351
Classification-JEL: C72, D83
KeyWords: Awareness, unknown unknowns, extensive-form rationalizability, prudent rationalizability, iterated admissibility, iterated conditional dominance
Creation-Date: 20220830
Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:351