Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Michael Magill
Author-Name-First: Michael
Author-Name-Last: Magill
Author-Name: Giacomo Bonanno
Author-Name-First: Giacomo
Author-Name-Last: Bonanno
Author-Name: Kristin Van Gaasback
Author-Name-First: Kristin Van
Author-Name-Last: Gaasback
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, University of California Davis
Title: BRANCHING TIME LOGIC, PERFECT INFORMATION GAMES AND BACKWARD INDUCTION
Abstract: The logical foundations of game-theoretic solution concepts have so far been developed within the confines of epistemic logic. In this paper we turn to a different branch of modal logic, namely temporal logic, and propose to view the solution of a game as a complete prediction about future play. We extend the branching time framework by adding agents and by defining the notion of prediction. We show that perfect information games are a special case of extended branching time frames and that the backward-induction solution is a prediction. We also provide a characterization of backward induction in terms of the property of internal consistency of prediction.
Length: 26
File-URL: https://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/72HUZQ7wtGXC4WLX9SZoNzXQ/98-13.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Number: 307
Classification-JEL: 
KeyWords: 
Creation-Date: 20030108
Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:307