Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Burkhard Schipper
Author-Name-First: Burkhard
Author-Name-Last: Schipper
Author-Name: Peter Duersch
Author-Name-First: Peter
Author-Name-Last: Duersch
Author-Name: Joerg Oechssler
Author-Name-First: Joerg
Author-Name-Last: Oechssler
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, University of California Davis
Title: Once Beaten, Never Again: Imitation in Two-Player Potential Games
Abstract: We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-better" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2 games, Cournot duopoly, price competition, public goods
 games, common pool resource games, and minimum effort coordination games.
Length: 14
File-URL: https://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/c4Kp5AVayyxTqejgfs4jCuZK/11-12.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Number: 26
Classification-JEL: C72, C73, D43
KeyWords: Imitate-the-best, learning, exact potential games, symmetric games, relative payoffs, zero-sum games
Creation-Date: 20111208
Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:26