Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Giacomo Bonanno
Author-Name-First: Giacomo
Author-Name-Last: Bonanno
Author-Name: Klaus Nehring
Author-Name-First: Klaus
Author-Name-Last: Nehring
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, University of California Davis
Title: EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS OF SOLUTION CONCEPTS IN GAME THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION
Abstract: We give an introduction to the literature on the epistemic foundations of solution concepts in game theory. Only normal-form games are considered. The solution concepts analyzed are rationalizability, strong rationalizability, correlated equilibrium and Nash equilibrium. The analysis is carried out locally in terms of properties of the belief hierarchies. Several examples are used throughout to illustrate definitions and concepts.
Length: 39
File-URL: https://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/x2r3PyETsxczkjnG29CM9xwB/97-21.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Number: 248
Classification-JEL: 
KeyWords: 
Creation-Date: 20030108
Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:248