Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Burkhard Schipper
Author-Name-First: Burkhard
Author-Name-Last: Schipper
Author-Name: Peter Duersch
Author-Name-First: Peter
Author-Name-Last: Duersch
Author-Name: Joerg Oechssler
Author-Name-First: Joerg
Author-Name-Last: Oechssler
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, University of California Davis
Title: Pure Strategy Equilibria in Symmetric Two-Player Zero-Sum Games
Abstract: We observe that a symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure strategy equilibrium if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors matrix. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has a pure equilibrium. Further sufficient conditions for existence are provided. Our findings extend to general two-player zero-sum games using the symmetrization of zero-sum games due to von Neumann. We point out that the class of symmetric two-player zero-sum games coincides with the class of relative payoff games associated with symmetric two-player games. This allows us to derive results on the existence of finite population evolutionary stable strategies.
Length: 15
File-URL: https://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/1ZhsfygifgcV1pZ9qnyos7ie/10-21.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Number: 240
Classification-JEL: C72, C73
KeyWords: Symmetric two-player games, zero-sum games, Rock-Paper-Scissors, single-peakedness, quasiconcavity, finite population evolutionary stable strategy, saddle point, exact potential games
Creation-Date: 20101122
Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:240