Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Christopher Knittel
Author-Name-First: Christopher
Author-Name-Last: Knittel
Author-Name: Victor Stango
Author-Name-First: Victor
Author-Name-Last: Stango
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, University of California Davis
Title: Strategic Incompatibility in ATM Markets
Abstract: We test whether firms use incompatibility strategically, using data from ATM markets.High ATM fees degrade the value of competitors? deposit accounts, and can in principle serveas a mechanism for siphoning depositors away from competitors or for creating deposit accountdifferentiation. Our empirical framework can empirically distinguish surcharging motivated bythis strategic concern from surcharging that simply maximizes ATM profit considered as a standaloneoperation. The results are consistent with such behavior by large banks, but not by smallbanks. For large banks, the effect of incompatibility seems to operate through higher depositaccount fees rather than increased deposit account base
Length: 31
File-URL: https://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/6N3ayDxFoxmqjL5SksJfrnWg/06-29.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Number: 225
Classification-JEL: D2, E3, L6
KeyWords: atm,industrial
Creation-Date: 20061115
Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:225