Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Burkhard Schipper
Author-Name-First: Burkhard
Author-Name-Last: Schipper
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, University of California Davis
Title: Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Games with Unawareness
Abstract: We extend Kuhn's Theorem to extensive games with unawareness. This extension is not entirely obvious: First, extensive games with non-trivial unawareness involve a forest of partially ordered game trees rather than just one game tree. An information set at a history in one tree may consist of histories in a less expressive tree. Consequently, perfect recall takes a more complicated form as players may also become aware of new actions during the play. Second, strategies can only be partially an object of ex-ante choice in games with unawareness. Finally, histories that a player may expect to reach with a strategy profile may not be the histories that actually occur with this strategy profile, requiring us to define appropriate notions of equivalence of strategies.
Length: 22
File-URL: https://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/WUNnNSpzc83KmpqoFy2TpSTh/17-6.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Number: 204
Classification-JEL: C72, D83
KeyWords: perfect recall, mixed strategy, behavior strategy, unawareness.
Creation-Date: 20171101
Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:204