Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Klaus Nehring
Author-Name-First: Klaus
Author-Name-Last: Nehring
Author-Name: Massimiliano Marcellino
Author-Name-First: Massimiliano
Author-Name-Last: Marcellino
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, University of California Davis
Title: MONOTONICITY IMPLIES STRATEGY-PROOFNESS FOR CORRESPONDENCES
Abstract: We show that Maskin monotone social choice correspondences on sufficiently rich domains satisfy a generalized strategy-proofness property, thus generalizing Muller and Satterthwaite''s (1977) theorem to correspondences. 
 From the point of view of Nash implementation theory, the result yields a partial characterization of the restrictions entailed by Nash implementability. Alternatively, the result can be viewed as a possibility theorem on the dominant-strategy-implementability of monotone SCCs via set-valued mechanisms for agents who are completely ignorant about the finally selected outcome. It is shown by examples that stronger strategy-proofness properties fail easily.
Length: 25
File-URL: https://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/UiqQaRaQnymuukUmMaJLSeex/98-2.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Number: 193
Classification-JEL: 
KeyWords: 
Creation-Date: 20030108
Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:193