Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Burkhard Schipper
Author-Name-First: Burkhard
Author-Name-Last: Schipper
Author-Name: Martin Meier
Author-Name-First: Martin
Author-Name-Last: Meier
Author-Name: Aviad Heifetz
Author-Name-First: Aviad
Author-Name-Last: Heifetz
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, University of California Davis
Title: Comprehensive Rationalizability
Abstract: We present a new solution concept for strategic games called comprehensive rationalizability that embodies "common cautious belief in rationality" based on a sound epistemic characterization in a universal type space. It refines rationalizability, but it neither refines nor is refined by iterated admissibility. Nevertheless, it coincides with iterated admissibility in many relevant economic applications.
Length: 35
File-URL: https://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/M7vK5rHE6kxDAmAZidxZAwoG/17-4.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Number: 186
Classification-JEL: C72
KeyWords: Common assumption of rationality, common belief in rationality, iterated admissibility, rationalizability, lexicographic belief systems
Creation-Date: 20170501
Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:186