Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Giacomo Bonanno
Author-Name-First: Giacomo
Author-Name-Last: Bonanno
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, University of California Davis
Title: Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games
Abstract: We discuss the issues that arise
 in modeling the notion of common belief of rationality in epistemic models
 of dynamic games, in particular at the level of interpretation of strategies.
 A strategy in a dynamic game is defined as a function that associates with every
 information set a choice at that information set. Implicit in this definition
 is a set of counterfactual statements concerning what a player would do
 at information sets that are not reached, or a belief revision policy concerning
 behavior at information sets that are ruled out by the initial beliefs.
 We discuss the role of both objective and subjective counterfactuals
 in attempting to flesh out the interpretation of strategies in epistemic
 models of dynamic games.
Length: 37
File-URL: https://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/FWBLygQwuuT1i8mjaNGQcTR6/14-9.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Number: 184
Classification-JEL: C7
KeyWords: Extensive-form game, strategy, counterfactual, belief revision, Kripke frame, modal logic
Creation-Date: 20140311
Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:184