Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Giacomo Bonanno
Author-Name-First: Giacomo
Author-Name-Last: Bonanno
Author-Name: Elias Tsakas
Author-Name-First: Elias
Author-Name-Last: Tsakas
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, University of California Davis
Title: Qualitative analysis of common belief of rationality in strategic-form games
Abstract: We study common belief of rationality in strategic-form games with ordinal utilities, employing a model of qualitative beliefs. We characterize the three main solution concepts for such games, viz., Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies (IDSDS), Iterated Deletion of Boergers-dominated Strategies (IDBS) and Iterated Deletion of Inferior Strategy Profiles (IDIP), by means of gradually restrictive properties imposed on the models of qualitative beliefs. As a corollary, we prove that IDIP refines IDBS, which refines IDSDS.
Length: 16
File-URL: https://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/WTtfpLJv3ic54bW6ynxAvZCc/17-5.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Number: 181
Classification-JEL: C7
KeyWords: Qualitative likelihood relation, ordinal payoffs, common belief of rationality, iterative deletion procedures
Creation-Date: 20170511
Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:181