Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Klaus Nehring
Author-Name-First: Klaus
Author-Name-Last: Nehring
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, University of California Davis
Title: INCENTIVE-COMPATIBILITY IN LARGE GAMES
Abstract: We argue that large games are of analytical interest partly because they can be understood in terms of a unifying condition of incentive-compatibility, strategyproofness. In contrast to finite games, strategy-proofness applies not only to dominantstrategy equilibria, but also to a large class of Nash equilibria and to Bayesian Nash equilibria with independent types.
 Based on Kolmogorov''s zero-one law, it is also shown that Bayesian Nash equilibria coincide with a class of Nash equilibria in games of incomplete information when there is a countably infinite number of players and types are independent.
Length: 18
File-URL: https://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/neGV8qSvC3a1XPgM4u5gzZGB/95-16.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Number: 155
Classification-JEL: 
KeyWords: 
Creation-Date: 20040712
Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:155